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I. CONTEXT AND PURPOSE OF THIS STUDY
The state youth corrections facilities, known as the California Youth
Authority (CYA), were once regarded as the pinnacle of enlightened juvenile

* Barry Krisberg is a Senior Fellow at the University of California Berkeley Law School. He led an
investigation of the CYA for the California Attorney General and has been the Court Expert on Safety and
Welfare issues in the Farrell Consent Decree since 2005.
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1

justice practice in the decades of the 1960s and 1970s. International travelers and
practitioners from many U.S. jurisdictions conducted site visits and attempted to
adopt many California policies and practices. The CYA was particularly prized
for its innovations in offender classification, therapeutic innovations, and its
commitment to the use of community-based corrections programs. While all was
2
not perfect in the CYA, its operations were superior to those in most other states.
In the 1980s, the political environment changed and became focused on
3
increasing punishment to deter juvenile offenders. The CYA budget for
treatment and rehabilitation was reduced, and there was a deliberate effort to
4
make the conditions of confinement harsher. Also, cutbacks in community
alternatives led to a large increase in the confined population in the CYA. By
5
1996, the population of CYA facilities exceeded 10,000 youths. Lengths of stay
for incarcerated youth were also increasing and a larger proportion of parole
violators were sent back to CYA facilities. Governor Schwarzenegger merged the
CYA under the umbrella of the state prison system, renaming it the Division of
6
Juvenile Facilities.
For nearly 20 years, the CYA, now renamed as the Division of Juvenile
Justice (DJJ), experienced a steady decline in its treatment and rehabilitation
programs and a serious deterioration in how its youth were cared for and
managed. In the first decade of the 21st century, there were a series of suicides in
DJJ facilities and well-publicized media accounts of severe crowding, high levels
of violence, extensive use of solitary confinement, and practices of holding some
7
youth in cages not fit for zoo animals as part of their education programs. A
video that allegedly showed several DJJ employees beating a young resident was

1. Throughout this paper we will refer to the California Youth Authority (CYA) and the Division of
Juvenile Justice (DJJ). These different names refer to the same state agency at various points in time. Also, the
name of the consent decree changed over time to recognize the new directors of DJJ as the defendant.
Originally it was referred to as Farrell v. Harper, and today it is known as Farrell v. Beard.
2. BARRY KRISBERG, JUVENILE JUSTICE: REDEEMING OUR CHILDREN at ix (2005).
3. See, e.g., Barry Krisberg, The Politics of Juvenile Justice: Then and Now, 15 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY
893, 901 (1990) (stating that the 1980s had “aggressive policies”); KRISBERG, supra note 2, at 58 (stating that
into the 1980s “a conservative reform agenda dominated” and it “emphasized deterrence and punishment as the
major goals of the juvenile court”).
4. See KRISBERG, supra note 2, at 58 (stating that under a conservative agenda some states introduced
mandatory minimums); BARRY KRISBERG ET AL., BERKELEY CTR. FOR CRIM. JUST., A NEW ERA IN
CALIFORNIA JUVENILE JUSTICE: DOWNSIZING THE STATE YOUTH CORRECTIONS SYSTEM at 5 (Oct. 2010),
available at https://www.law.berkeley.edu/files/A_New_Era_10-22-2010.pdf (on file with the McGeorge Law
Review) (stating that as costs continued to rise, but state grants were not, alternatives such as sending youth to
state prison became cheaper).
5. KRISBERG et al., supra note 4, at 1.
6. Id.
7. Id. at 14.
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published on the Internet and made almost all the national television network
8
news outlets.
Recidivism rates for youth leaving DJJ facilities were among the worst in the
nation. Some in the legislature called for the abolition of the DJJ or at least a halt
9
to new admissions. In 2003, the Prison Law Office and the prestigious corporate
10
law firm of Latham Watkins filed class action lawsuits against the DJJ.
California Attorney General Bill Lockyer and the then CYA ordered an
11
exhaustive investigation led by a panel of juvenile justice experts. This 2003
review found that the DJJ was violating many state and federal laws and
12
engaging in serious violations of the U.S. Constitution. Based on these findings,
Governor Schwarzenegger agreed in 2004 to settle a lawsuit that is today known
13
as Farrell v. Beard. The resulting consent decree is one of the most far-reaching
14
remedial plans in American juvenile justice history.
This is when the downward spiral of California youth facilities began to
slowly change. The Legislature appropriated a significant amount of funding to
remedy some of the critical staffing shortages and several new laws were enacted
15
to limit the types of youth who could be sent to the DJJ. New leadership was
recruited to lead the reforms.
As of July 2014, the DJJ has met virtually all of the requirements and the
outside monitors have agreed that the DJJ is in substantial compliance with issues
in the areas of safety and welfare of youth, health and dental care, education,

8. Id. at 13–15.
9. Id. at 1–2 (illustrating that lawmakers were reacting to high recidivism rates, so “legislators enacted
comprehensive reforms to ‘realign’ the juvenile justice system”).
10. See Complaint at 1, 40, Farrell v. Harper, No. RG 03079344 (Cal. Super. Ct., Alameda Cnty. Jan. 6,
2003), available at http://www.prisonlaw.com/pdfs/cyastate.pdf (on file with the McGeorge Law Review)
(filing a complaint against Jerry Harper, the Director of the California Youth Authority).
11. Barry Krisberg, Reforming the California Division of Juvenile Justice: What’s the End Game, 25 FED.
SENT’G REP. 281 (2012) [hereinafter End Game].
12. The complete set of reports that were filed by the experts is available via the Prison Law Office at
www.prisonlaw.com.
13. Consent Decree at 1, Farrell v. Allen, No. RG 03079344 (Cal. Super. Ct., Alameda Cnty. July 28,
2004), available at http://www.cdcr.ca.gov/juvenile_justice/docs/ConsentDecree.pdf [hereinafter Consent
Decree] (on file with the McGeorge Law Review); see also Major Cases & Achievements, PRISONLAW.COM,
http://www.prisonlaw.com/ cases.php (last visited Feb. 20, 2015) (stating that under Farrell v. Harper, now
known as Farrell v. Beard, CYA officials signed a consent decree).
14. Consent Decree at 1, Farrell v. Allen, No. RG 03079344 (Cal. Super. Ct., Alameda Cnty. July 28,
2004), available at http://www.cdcr.ca.gov/juvenile_justice/docs/ConsentDecree.pdf [hereinafter Consent
Decree] (on file with the McGeorge Law Review); see also Major Cases & Achievements, PRISONLAW.COM,
http://www.prisonlaw.com/ cases.php (last visited Feb. 20, 2015) (stating that under Farrell v. Harper, now
known as Farrell v. Beard, CYA officials signed a consent decree).
15. Sue Burrell, The Legislature’s Role in Juvenile Justice Reform: A California Example, NCCD BLOG,
(Apr. 7, 2014), http://nccdglobal.org/blog/the-legislature-s-role-in-juvenile-justice-reform-a-california-example
(on file with the McGeorge Law Review).
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16

disability rights, and effective programs for sex offenders. While not completed,
the DJJ has made major improvements in mental health diagnoses and treatment.
It is expected that these areas will be completed within the next eighteen months.
17
Even more remarkably, the DJJ population fell below 680 youth in 2013.
The legislature enacted several laws that encourage counties to hold non-violent,
18
non-sex offenders in local programs. Parole violators, once about half of the
CYA institutional population, are now also managed at the county level.
Localities receive approximately $120 million annually to provide services for
19
these youth. The DJJ closed eight institutions and five camp programs. This
decarceration effort is the largest one ever in the history of the juvenile justice
20
system. And, despite predictions of “doom and gloom” by many law
enforcement officials, the juvenile and young adult arrest rate has continued to
decline and there is no evidence that more young people are being sent to adult
prisons or jails, or being housed in county detention centers due to decarceration
21
at state youth facilities.
The goal of this Article is to understand the key elements of this remarkable
success story. The story is not well known outside the DJJ and the people
involved in the Farrell consent decree. Lessons learned are highly relevant to the
future of other juvenile corrections systems and for adult corrections as well.
While not perfect, the current DJJ is one of the most progressive juvenile
corrections systems in the nation. The DJJ today offers many very valuable
policies and processes that could well benefit other jurisdictions. This Article
attempts to understand the people and the methods that produced this
extraordinary step forward in the enlightened treatment of troubled and
troublesome young people.

16. See Twenty-Ninth Report of the Special Master at 26, Farrell v. Beard (No. RG 03079344) (Cal.
Super. Ct., Alameda Cnty. July 28, 2014), available at http://www.prisonlaw.com/pdfs/OSM29.pdf [hereinafter
Twenty-Ninth Report] (on file with the McGeorge Law Review) (stating that defendant is to be congratulated).
17. See id. at 2.
18. See e.g. S.B. 459, 2003 Leg. Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2003) (stating that facilities must regularly report back
to counties on the status of youth); S.B. 81, 2007 Leg. Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2007) (stating that “the bill would
require the county to apply to the Corrections Standards Authority for approval of a county institution”); A.B.
1628, 2010 Leg. Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2010) (stating that “[b]y imposing additional duties on counties, this bill
would create a state-mandated local program”).
19. See A.B. 1913, 2000 Leg. Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2000) (stating that the act increases the amount of
Supplemental Law Enforcement Services Fund to 243,350,000 annually, half of which is to be allocated to
implement juvenile justice plans).
20. See Krisberg et al., supra note 4, at 1.
21. Id.
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II. STUDY METHODS
To complete this study I reviewed the original CYA consent decree materials
as well as the remedial plans submitted by the DJJ. I had access to all of the
compliance reports developed by the various experts that were appointed by the
court pursuant to the Farrell consent decree. These generally included
comprehensive summaries that each of the experts produced at year end for the
period 2009–2013. Most important, I could rely on excellent reports on the
progress of the remedial plans that were submitted by the Office of the Special
Master (OSM). I had in depth discussions with the Special Master Nancy
22
Campbell and the Deputy Special Master John Chen.
I conducted far-ranging interviews with the principal plaintiffs’ attorneys
Donald Specter and Sara Norman of the Prison Law Office and with Van
Kamberian, who represented the defendants in the Farrell case.
I developed a very brief questionnaire about the reform process and
conducted thirty to forty-five minute phone interviews with many of the Court
experts and with virtually every DJJ manager who worked on the Farrell
remedial plans. I was able to have detailed conversations with the
superintendents of all the remaining DJJ facilities. I asked each of these
knowledgeable interviewees to reflect on the largest challenges faced by DJJ and
their view of major accomplishments. I asked interviewees to discuss their
perspectives on the “unfinished agenda” of reform and the keys to successes. We
also discussed remedial strategies that did not yield the expected positive results.
Each of the interviewees was asked to identify other people to be
interviewed. In all, I talked with over fifty DJJ and Farrell case insiders. I also
reached out to a number of outside youth advocates who had closely followed the
DJJ reforms. While I have tried to faithfully reflect these staff, advocates’ and
management perspectives, I assume the ultimate responsibility for all of the
observations and opinions in this report.
While I briefly examined the dynamics of reform in each of the remedial
areas, I focused primarily of the major elements of the safety and welfare plan,
with which I had direct familiarity.
In the course of my several site visits to DJJ institutions, I conducted over
one hundred interviews with youth residents and staff. These interviews were
conducted under strict requirements of confidentiality and privacy. These firsthand viewpoints were partially summarized in prior reports written for the
23
court.
22. All of these materials are available from the Prison Law Office at www.prisonlaw.com or the
California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation at www.cdcr.ca.gov.
23. Barry Krisberg, The Long and Winding Road: Juvenile Corrections Reform in California, CHIEF J.
EARL WARREN INST. OF L. & SOC. POL’Y (May 2011), available at https://www.law.berkeley.edu/files/
Long_and_Winding_Road_Publication-final.pdf [hereinafter The Long and Winding Road] (on file with the
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I had total access to DJJ data on incident reports, youth grievances and useof-force (UOF) reviews. Each month I participated in a multi-disciplinary staff
task force that reviewed a cross section of UOF reports, including staff behavior
reports about youth, and the case plans and case notes on individual youth. The
DJJ allowed me complete access to any information that I requested and
respected my request to preserve the confidentiality of the youthful residents. I
visited the DJJ facilities many times over the past ten years and have enjoyed
open access to all living units and staff in DJJ.
To place these observations within a broader policy context, I reviewed
excellent case studies that were conducted in other state juvenile facilities in
Arizona, Massachusetts, Missouri and New York. These were all states that made
major strides in correcting legal deficiencies and implementing evidence-based
24
policies and practices. The findings of these case studies will be compared with
the DJJ findings.
III. WHAT WERE THE MOST DIFFICULT CHALLENGES FACING DJJ?
In 2004, state facilities faced significant crowding. Even as the population
declined from its peak of over 10,000 youth residents in the late 1990s, many
living units were still jammed with often more than sixty-five to seventy young
25
people in a unit. Custody staffing levels were inefficient and the personnel to
deliver core services were inadequate. Further, the CDCR possessed byzantine
and time-consuming policies to evaluate and sanction staff engaging in serious
misconduct. Abuses in worker’s compensation and leave practices reduced the
actual number of staff that showed up at work to supervise the youth.
Crowding was exacerbated by the closures of some DJJ facilities due to the
crumbling infrastructure and the expense of fixing the electrical, sewage, and
plumbing systems in these older facilities. Other facilities were shut down for a
variety of reasons, including media accounts of abusive practices and riots and
fires that destroyed several older living units. There were consistent budget

McGeorge Law Review); End Game, supra note 11, at 281–85; Barry Krisberg, Farrell vs. Beard: Final
Comprehensive Report on Safety and Welfare, CHIEF J. EARL WARREN INST. OF L. & SOC. POL’Y (2013)
[hereinafter Farrell vs. Beard: Final Comprehensive Report] (expressing, at various points, the viewpoints of
DJJ staff and residents).
24. See ALEXANDRA COX, JUVENILE FACILITY STAFF RESPONSES TO ORGANIZATIONAL CHANGE (2013);
SCOTT H. DECKER ET AL., A CASE STUDY OF THE RESPONSE OF THE ARIZONA DEPARTMENT OF JUVENILE
CORRECTIONS TO THE CIVIL RIGHTS OF INSTITUTIONALIZED PERSONS ACT CONSENT DECREE (2011);
RICHARD A. MENDEL, THE MISSOURI MODEL: REINVENTING THE PRACTICE OF REHABILITATING YOUTHFUL
OFFENDERS (2010).
25. See LIZZIE BUCHEN, CTR. ON JUV. & CRIM. JUST., CALIFORNIA’S DIVISION OF JUVENILE FACILITIES:
NINE YEARS AFTER FARRELL (Apr. 2013), available at http://www.cjcj.org/uploads/cjcj/documents/state_of_
djf.pdf (on file with the McGeorge Law Review) (stating that one of the top priorities of the remedial plan is
smaller living units of sixteen to twenty-five youth).
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pressures by the Department of Finance and the Legislature to reduce the costs of
the system. Within a few years the DJJ closed eight major institutions and five
camp programs. Despite CDCR plans to “re-purpose” these closed institutions,
most have remained shuttered or were torn down. Budget cutbacks led to the
closure of many vocational and educational programs. Even recreation offerings
were shrunk. Medical, dental and mental health services were not well funded
and reentry or parole resources were disappearing. Staff morale was very poor.
Annual costs per youth had risen seven-fold in the early 2000s due to new
26
union contracts that included significant salary and benefit increases. There
were also added overhead costs created by the oversight of CDCR. The
substantially enhanced health care, education, and treatment services that were
27
mandated by the legal challenges pushed up the costs of DJJ operations. As the
resident population declined, DJJ was unable to shrink its headquarters staffing
and costs to match the smaller system. All of these factors made the per-youth
costs climb.
For several years, DJJ staff had embraced the professional orientation of
adult corrections officers. To justify increasing pay for its members to the level
of state police officers, the DJJ union leaders asserted that youth facilities were as
28
dangerous as state prisons and constituted “the toughest beat in the state.” The
conventional corrections mentality was to confront, contain, and punish
misconduct by the young residents. While there were many staff interested in
delivering rehabilitation programming, these employees were not supported by
management for many years. In almost all aspects of DJJ daily activities, security
and custody were the overriding considerations. DJJ lacked written policies in
many crucial areas, leaving staff to make snap judgments on how to handle many
complex and threatening situations. The Division was operated with very
informal management methods. Programs and services were not routinely
monitored or evaluated by DJJ leaders. Anecdotes, not reliable information,
drove facility and headquarters decision-making.
There was a major problem of violence in DJJ facilities. Frequent fights, staff
assaults, facility lockdowns, and group disturbances became the daily norm. Fear
of out-of-control violence led staff to rely excessively on mechanical and
chemical restraints to control the perceived chaos in the living units. The use of
solitary confinement and locking youth in their cells twenty-three hours a day
29
grew. As noted earlier, there was a rash of attempted and completed suicides.
26. See KRISBERG ET AL., supra note 4, at 11.
27. See id. (stating that the “Farrell consent decree has required hiring more medical, mental health, and
education staff for CYA facilities and this has led to cost increases”).
28. JOSHUA PAGE, THE TOUGHEST BEAT: POLITICS, PUNISHMENT, AND THE PRISON OFFICERS UNION IN
CALIFORNIA (2011); see The Long and Winding Road, supra note 23 (stating that “a very strong union of
corrections workers increased its power”).
29. KRISBERG ET AL., supra note 4, at 12.
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The totality of the facts listed above eroded support for the DJJ among
juvenile justice professionals, youth advocates, elected officials, the media, and
the public at large. There were questions about how long the state should
continue to operate corrections programs for youthful offenders. The largest
challenge faced by DJJ managers was to somehow restore confidence that the
organization could operate in a professional and effective manner. The steady
barrage of criticism of the DJJ in a variety of public forums created bitterness and
a sense of impending loss of jobs among virtually all DJJ direct-care staff and
managers. Over the many years of steady decline, the DJJ suffered from
inconsistent and ever changing leadership. Since 1980, there had been more than
twenty directors and acting directors of the agency and several of these political
appointments lacked apparent qualifications and training to run a major youth
30
corrections agency. In an era dominated by the rhetoric of “getting tough on
crime,” governors generally preferred candidates with law enforcement
31
backgrounds and histories of political party loyalty.
Another dilemma was that the DJJ became more and more isolated from
juvenile justice professionals at the county level and with those from other states.
DJJ managers stopped attending national conferences of juvenile justice
32
professionals. The internationally renowned CYA research division was gutted.
Very little research and evaluation was being conducted, and the DJJ was not
especially welcoming to university-based researchers. DJJ leaders were not
exposed to the emerging research on evidence-based programming. Moreover,
there was great resistance in the agency to learning about alternative approaches
that were being implemented in states such as Missouri, Oregon, Colorado or
33
Washington.

30. See The Long and Winding Road, supra note 23 (stating that “the CYA had a procession of
directors”); History of the DJJ, CAL. DEP’T OF CORR. & REHAB., http://www.cdcr.ca.gov/Juvenile_Justice/DJJ_
History/Index.html (last visited Feb. 22, 2015) (on file with the McGeorge Law Review) (listing 10 named
directors since 1980).
31. See The Long and Winding Road, supra note 23 (stating that “directors . . . were often retired law
enforcement officials or strictly political cronies”).
32. See KRISBERG ET AL., supra note 4, at 1.
33. See generally RICHARD A. MENDEL, ANNIE E. CASEY FOUND., THE MISSOURI METHOD:
REINVENTING THE PRACTICE OF REHABILITATING YOUTHFUL OFFENDERS 2 (2010) (looking at Missouri’s
practices); ELIZABETH SEIGLE, COUNCIL OF STATE GOV’TS, MEASURING YOUTH OUTCOMES IN JUVENILE
JUSTICE: THE LEADERSHIP OF OREGON YOUTH AUTHORITY (Mar. 19, 2014), available at http://csgjustice
center.org/youth/posts/measuring-youth-outcomes-in-juvenile-justice-the-leadership-of-oregon-youth-authority/
(on file with the McGeorge Law Review) (examining those in Oregon); JUST. POL’Y INST., THE COSTS OF
CONFINEMENT: WHY GOOD JUVENILE JUSTICE POLICIES MAKE GOOD FISCAL SENSE 12–13 (2009) (explaining
the results of Washington’s practices); Jordan Steffen, Population Dropping in Colorado Youth Corrections
Facilities, DENVER POST (Mar. 3, 2013), http://www.denverpost.com/ci_22706558/population-droppingcolorado-youth-corrections-facilities (on file with the McGeorge Law Review) (explaining the results of
Colorado’s methods).
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IV. SIGNIFICANT REFORM ACCOMPLISHMENTS
The DJJ has met or exceeded the mandated reforms that were listed in the
Farrell consent decree in most areas involving dental and medical health care, sex
34
offender treatment programs, and general and special education issues. There is
substantial compliance with the dictates of the remedial plans in the areas of the
35
care of disabled youth and in most of the safety and welfare issues. There are
only a few outstanding matters in these last two remedial areas that are being
monitored by the OSM.
Reforms in the Mental Health domain were the last to really get going at DJJ,
but the court expert Bruce Gage has noted that substantial progress is being made
and that DJJ is almost halfway to full compliance with the required mental health
36
remedial tasks.
Most dramatically, the youth population of the DJJ has been reduced by over
37
90% from when the initial Farrell case was filed. Today there are less than 700
38
youth confined in DJJ’s three institutions and one camp program. This number
includes about 140 youngsters who were sentenced as adults and may be
39
transferred to CDCR when they become eighteen years old.
As noted earlier, many obsolete DJJ facilities have been closed and the
remaining living units are all well below the Farrell goals of thirty-two youth in a
living unit and sixteen youth per wing. While staffing at headquarters and some
facility administrative staff have been modestly reduced, the ratio of direct-care
staff to youth is quite impressive. Staffing ratios have also been improved for
teachers, health care professionals, and mental health professionals.
Many of these reductions in the youth population and staffing enhancements
were produced via legislative actions and consistent support of DJJ budget
requests from the Governor’s office and the Senate and Assembly Budget
40
Committees.
34. See The Long and Winding Road, supra note 23.
35. See id.
36. See, e.g., Bruce Gage, Mental Health Audit Comprehensive Summary 1, in Twenty-Ninth Report of
the Special Master, Farrell v. Beard, No. RG 03079344 (Cal. Super. Ct., Alameda Cnty. July 28, 2014),
available at http://www.prisonlaw.com/pdfs/OSM29.pdf (on file with the McGeorge Law Review).
37. Barry Krisberg, California’s Youth Prisons Nearing an End, S.F. CHRON. (Feb. 1, 2012),
http://www.sfgate.com/opinion/openforum/article/California-s-youth-prisons-nearing-an-end-2888214.php
[hereinafter California’s Youth Prisons Nearing an End] (on file with the McGeorge Law Review).
38. CAL. DEP’T OF CORR. & REHAB., DIV. OF JUVENILE JUSTICE, POPULATION OVERVIEW 1 (2014),
available at http://www.cdcr.ca.gov/Reports_Research/docs/research/Population_Overview/POPOVER2014.
pdf (on file with the McGeorge Law Review).
39. Id.
40. See, e.g., California’s Youth Prisons Nearing an End, supra note 37 (noting one such populationdecreasing legislative initiative); Commonweal California Budget Bulletin (Jan. 15, 2013), available at
www.comjj.org/wp.../10/FY13-14CAbudget-JuvJusticeFundStatus1.doc (on file with the McGeorge Law
Review) (noting a granting of funds in support of DJJ’s goals).
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A. Reducing Policies and Practices Harming Youth
As noted earlier, the alleviation of crowding and the implementation of more
appropriate staffing levels produced a significant decline in violent incidents in
terms of youth-on-youth assaults, staff assaults, and group disturbances.
Reducing violence and fear at DJJ facilities is at the core of the Farrell remedial
plans. These drops in violence were most pronounced at the O.H. Close Youth
Correctional Facility (OHCYCF) but also were observed at the N.A. Chaderjian
41
Youth Correctional Facility (NACYCF). Violence reductions took longer to
manifest at the Ventura Youth Correctional Facility (VYCF), which was the most
42
troubled of all the DJJ facilities for the past several years. But in the first half of
43
2014, VYCF recorded lower levels of violence than in previous periods. And it
44
appears that more improvements could be expected in the near future.
Reductions in youth violence were also accompanied by a number of very
positive outcomes. The frequency of UOF incidents went down significantly at
45
46
OHCYCF and NACYCF. There was also progress on this issue at the VYCF.
For example, the rate of UOF incidents at Ventura dropped from a high of .73 per
100 days of youth confinement in May 2013 to .48 per 100 days of youth
47
confinement in May of 2014.
DJJ developed a set of comprehensive policies designed to limit the UOF and
to encourage staff to deescalate the response to youth behavior. Direct-line staff
received increased training in conflict resolution and safe intervention
approaches. The use of chemical restraints has not been completely eliminated,
but its use is way down in mental health units and cases involving single youth
that do not involve assaults of other youth or staff.
DJJ developed a regular format by which each facility reviews its major UOF
incidents on a monthly basis. These reviews are conducted by a multidisciplinary
team at the facility and cover topics such as staff compliance with formal
policies, the completeness and accuracy of UOF incident reporting, and whether
there may have been more appropriate responses to the circumstances that led to

41. Twentieth Report of the Special Master at 17–18, Farrell v. Cate, No. RG 03079344 (Cal. Super. Ct.,
Alameda Cnty. Jan. 5, 2012), available at http://www.prisonlaw.com/pdfs/OSM20Full.pdf [hereinafter
Twentieth Report] (on file with the McGeorge Law Review).
42. Id. at 15.
43. Farrell vs. Beard: Final Comprehensive Report, supra note 23, at 14.
44. Detailed evidence for much of what is reported in this section can be found in Farrell vs. Beard:
Final Comprehensive Report, supra note 23, and Twenty-Ninth Report of the Special Master, Farrell v. Beard,
No. RG 03079344 (Cal. Super. Ct., Alameda Cnty. July 28, 2014), available at http://www.prisonlaw.com/pdfs/
OSM29.pdf (on file with the McGeorge Law Review).
45. Farrell vs. Beard: Final Comprehensive Report, supra note 23, at 13.
46. Id.
47. Twenty-Ninth Report .
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48

the UOF. Where indicated, these reviews lead to internal investigations and/or
mandated additional training and close supervision for the involved staff.
Security managers are required to examine whether the UOF was the least
49
amount required to protect the safety and security of the youth and staff. The
review must consider the disability status of the youth and if the ADA
50
requirements were followed. The timeliness and adequacy of the medical staff’s
51
response to UOF events is also evaluated.
At DJJ Headquarters, an interdisciplinary team of managers, the Deputy
OSM and the Court expert on safety and welfare convene monthly to examine a
sample of the UOF cases at every facility. This headquarters team assesses the
adequacy of the facility-level review process and makes recommendations for
further actions as required. The headquarters team, chaired by the Deputy
Director of DJJ, produces a memorandum to each facility on needed corrective
52
actions. Also examined are case notes produced after the event to provide
greater insight into causes of UOF incidents and guidance on how to prevent
reoccurrences of these events in the future.
The UOF review process evolved from the recommendations of a staff and
management task force designed to reduce UOF, especially for youth with
disabilities. That task force reviewed scores of UOF reports and found that past
practices were inadequate. The new guidelines to review UOF were vetted by the
OSM, the Court experts for safety and welfare and mental health and the
53
plaintiffs’ and defendants’ attorneys. The resulting UOF scrutiny is
comprehensive and thorough. Few if any juvenile corrections systems across the
Nation have a comparable UOF review process. No such careful UOF
examinations are routine in most California county facilities. One exception is
54
Los Angeles County, which was subject to a major U.S. DOJ lawsuit.

48. CHRISOTPHER MURRAY ET AL., CAL. DEP’T OF CORR. & REHAB., DIV. OF JUVENILE JUST., SAFETY
WELFARE REMEDIAL PLAN: IMPLEMENTING REFORM IN CALIFORNIA 25–26 (2006), available at
http://www.cdcr.ca.gov/juvenile_justice/ docs/safetywelfareplan.pdf (on file with the McGeorge Law Review).
49. Id. at 25.
50. See CTR. ON JUVENILE AND CRIMINAL JUST., FARRELL SPECIAL MASTER COMPLIANCE TABLE 2 (July
2011), available at http://www.cjcj.org/uploads/cjcj/documents/18th_special_master_report.pdf [hereinafter
FARRELL SPECIAL MASTER COMPLIANCE TABLE] (on file with the McGeorge Law Review).
51. See, e.g., FARRELL MEDICAL EXPERTS, SECOND REPORT OF CONSENT DECREE BASED ON SITE VISITS
5 (2011), available at http://www.prisonlaw.com/pdfs/OSM9AppC.pdf (on file with the McGeorge Law
Review).
52. See, e.g., FARRELL SPECIAL MASTER COMPLIANCE TABLE, supra note 50.
53. See CAL. DEP’T OF CORR. & REHAB., DIV. OF JUVENILE JUST., INITIAL STATEMENT OF REASONS FOR
USE OF FORCE POLICY 5, available at http://www.cdcr.ca.gov/Regulations/Juvenile_Justice/docs/Initial
StatementOfReasons.pdf (on file with the McGeorge Law Review).
54. See U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., MEMORANDUM OF AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND THE
COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES REGARDING THE LOS ANGELES PROBATION CAMPS 5, available at
http://www.justice.gov/crt/about/spl/documents/lacamps_moa.pdf (on file with the McGeorge Law Review).
AND

785

2014 / Reforming the Division of Juvenile Justice
There have been significant reductions in the reliance on solitary
55
confinement in the DJJ since 2005. The older and discredited policy and
practice of confining youth in a lockup unit for twenty-three hours a day with
minimal services is gone. In its place, the DJJ has developed a range of options
that constitute a short-term limitation on the program of youth who are in some
56
kind of crisis and who may be a danger to themselves or others. These
alternatives include a very short-term “cool down period” in the youngster’s
room (or in a separate room in those few remaining dormitory units). Another
option for staff is to utilize “room confinement” in which the youth stays in his
own room, usually for less than a day. Youth needing more specialized attention
are managed in the Treatment Intervention Program (TIP), which is designed to
last only a few days.
Data on TIP for June 2014 revealed that more than half of the youngsters
assigned to this program were returned to regular programs within one day and
57
only 18% were in TIP for more than three days. Most important, the TIP
program includes educational services and mental health services and is designed
to return youth back to their regular programs as soon as possible. The goal of
TIP is not punishment, but closely monitored separation for a very short duration
to assist the youth to return to a more appropriate program placement and
treatment services. These limited program options permitted the DJJ to eliminate
temporary detention that had been a regular feature of past DJJ practice. Further,
these programs rely on delivery of counseling and mental health interventions,
not deprivation of basic services. Youth in TIP generally spend a large number of
waking hours out of their rooms and engaged in education, recreation, and other
58
positive activities. This approach is consistent with the best professional
thinking and the growing literature on the harm to adolescents of extreme
59
isolation.
The most restrictive level of limited programming is the Behavioral
Treatment Program (BTP). These youth have engaged in repeated and very
serious disciplinary infractions. The BTP had sixty-five youngsters assigned to it
in June 2014. The twenty-two youth in the OHCYCF BTP stayed an average of
thirty-seven days. At NACYCF there were fifteen residents of the BTP, who
stayed an average of 106 days, and at VYCF there were twenty-eight youth, who
55. But see, e.g., Ryan Gabrielson, Juvenile Inmates Often Isolated Nearly 24 Hours Straight, CAL.
WATCH (June 13, 2011), http://californiawatch.org/dailyreport/juvenile-inmates-often-isolated-nearly-24-hoursstraight-10757 (on file with the McGeorge Law Review).
56. See Twenty-Fourth Report of the Special Master app. B, at 6, Farrell v. Cate, No. RG 03079344 (Cal.
Super. Ct., Alameda Cnty. Jan. 3, 2013), available at http://www.prisonlaw.com/pdfs/OSM24.pdf (on file with
the McGeorge Law Review) (explaining the use of such alternatives at OHCYCF).
57. See Twenty-Ninth Report, supra note 16, at 52..
58. See PAUL DEMURO, TOWARD ABOLISHING THE USE OF DISCIPLINARY ISOLATION IN JUVENILE
JUSTICE INSTITUTIONS: SOME INITIAL IDEAS (REVISED) 2 (Jan. 22, 2014).
59. Id.
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stayed an average of 106 days. These average lengths-of-stay figures are greatly
affected by a very small number of young people who might remain in the BTP
for a very long period. More typical BTP assignments are for less than two
months.
Before the Farrell reforms took hold, the DJJ lockup units had as many as
400 youth on any given day and the length of stay was at least 270 days. In the
“bad old days,” the lockup units included a wide range of youth who had
engaged in serious assaults, defied staff orders, evidenced severe mental health
issues, or were in the lockup unit in protective custody. The BTP is now almost
reserved exclusively for very assaultive young people, and the DJJ uses its other
programming options for young people who may need temporary separation from
their regular living units.
Youth in the BTPs spend most of their waking hours outside their rooms,
receiving a full range of education and treatment services. The BTP staff assist
youth to gradually reenter their regular housing units through a phased process of
helping the youth increase their personal skills to manage and defuse potentially
violent situations.
The BTPs are still evolving as a program model. In the early days of the
BTPs, these units closely resembled the old lock up units, with extensive and
routine use by staff of mechanical and chemical restraints. As staff on the BTP
units received more training and coaching in the new model, the conditions and
treatment of young people in the BTPs markedly improved.
DJJ introduced more services, counseling, and groups in the BTP units that
focused on cognitive behavioral skills, anger management, and preparation for
community reentry. Staff assigned to the BTPs have embraced the new
philosophy of increasing mental health services, improving youth communication
and conflict resolution skills, and providing opportunities for vocational and
educational achievements.
Idleness was a big issue at the DJJ in the early days of the Farrell case.
Youth spent many hours in their rooms or in living unit day rooms. School was
often cancelled due to lack of teaching staff. Vocational programs and postsecondary classes, once a strong point in CYA facilities, had all but disappeared.
Recreational programming was minimal and art and music offerings had all but
disappeared. Religious services were under-staffed and underfunded. Library
resources were poorly organized and not very accessible to the youth. Almost all
the young people wanted work assignments, but unemployment in the DJJ was
epidemic and chronic.
The Farrell experts believed that idleness was a major contributor to
60
violence and other serious misbehavior among DJJ residents. DJJ staff also
clamored for more activities to keep the young people positively engaged and
60. See, e.g., Twentieth supra note 41, at 22.
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motivated to succeed. One important component that cut across most of the
Farrell remedial plans was to establish a target of the number of waking hours
that youth would be expected to be involved in positive, pro-social activities.
Next, it was vital to develop a Program Service Day (PSD) for each living unit
that would organize the various services, allowing education, counseling, groups,
recreation, and health care staff to get work assignments completed. Staff
struggled over the reconciliation of the different work schedules of differing
kinds of DJJ personnel. Management decided to assert the primacy of education
61
services, but insisted that adequate time be devoted to other youth needs. It took
some time to develop the Program Service Days and train staff on the necessity
of actually following the schedules. The DJJ was also able to make use of a
newly completed automated information system to ensure that the PSD
guidelines were being followed or that impediments to offering the PSD were
identified and removed. The PSD was commenced on a pilot basis, but it was
eventually adapted and expanded to all DJJ living units. Staff and youth
expressed strong support for the predictability and daily structure that resulted
from the PSD.
The implementation of the PSD was indicative of a decisive move by DJJ
managers to upgrade and improve virtually all of the agencies policies and
procedures. Prior to the Farrell litigation, there were inconsistent and uneven
62
practices between the facilities and within living units at the same facility. Staff
were legitimately confused as to what would be expected of them in a multitude
63
of areas. For a major state bureaucracy, it was unusual that the DJJ ran so
informally, with little documentation or accountability. When problems would
arise, staff were uncertain if they would be blamed for untoward outcomes. DJJ
managers and direct-care staff became increasingly “risk averse” and thus limited
the nature and extent of youth opportunities that could be put in place. Youth
interpreted the lack of consistency by staff as prejudice or bias, and they
perceived staff reluctance to try new activities as indicative of a general lack of
regard for their well-being. If there were rules, no one seemed to know what they
were.
In all, the DJJ developed or refreshed nearly 800 operational policies and
procedures. Rewriting policies encouraged different disciplines to work together
and facility managers to weigh in on particularizing the agency-wide policies for
their facilities. The revised policies were closely vetted by the court experts and

61. See Sixth Report of the Special Master, attachment 1, at 4, Farrell v. Tilton, No. RG 03079344 (Cal.
Super. Ct., Alameda Cnty. Dec. 2007), available at https://www.prisonlegalnews.org/media/publications/
farrell_v_tilton_ca_cya_djj_6th_sm_report_mental_health_2008.pdf (on file with the McGeorge Law Review).
62. Id.
63. See, e.g., Sixth Report of the Special Master, app. A, at 2, Farrell v. Tilton, No. RG 03079344 (Cal.
Super. Ct., Alameda Cnty. Dec. 2007), available at https://www.prisonlegalnews.org/media/publications/
farrell_v_tilton_ca_cya_djj_6th_sm_report_mental_health_2008.pdf (on file with the McGeorge Law Review).
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the plaintiffs’ counsel. The updated policies were designed to be consistent with
federal and state legal requirements, and the policy teams looked to best practices
identified in the juvenile justice literature. The DJJ policy development team
65
surveyed several other states for advice and copies of existing policies. Union
representatives were included in these discussions through a “meet and confer”
process, but did not possess veto power on the central elements of the policies.
Once the policies were approved by top DJJ management, the agency mapped
out a deliberate strategy to train all of those who needed to understand and
66
implement the new policies. In a sense, this process led to a fundamental
reinvention of the DJJ that was consistent with its new mission to be a place of
high quality evidence-based services for troubled youth.
B. Expanding and Enhancing Treatment and Rehabilitation Services
The transitions at the DJJ are all examples of the efforts to counteract or
eliminate ineffective and harmful methods to influence youth behavior. However,
of equal importance were major strides forward towards enhancing the positive
interventions with DJJ youngsters. There have been substantial upgrades in the
quality and quantity of resources devoted to health care, mental health services,
support of youth with disabilities, and educational and special education
programming. As part of the Farrell consent decree, the DJJ committed to
constructing and implementing a model treatment program. While this objective
was very ambitious, and very few states offer good prototypes of model
treatment systems, the DJJ made an unequivocal commitment to offering highquality, evidence-based rehabilitation services in a planned and systematic
manner.
DJJ managers visited other juvenile corrections systems in Washington,
Colorado, and Missouri to learn from the treatment approaches in these
jurisdictions. The decision was made to develop an Integrated Behavior
Treatment Model (IBTM) that was tailored to the unique attributes of youth and
other localized factors, including the length of stay, the influence of gangs in the
DJJ, the shared responsibility with counties, and the larger size of California

64. See generally Sixth Report of the Special Master, app. A, attachment 1, Farrell v. Tilton, No. RG
03079344 (Cal. Super. Ct., Alameda Cnty. Dec. 2007), available at https://www.prisonlegalnews.org/media/
publications/farrell_v_tilton_ca_cya_djj_6th_sm_report_mental_health_2008.pdf (on file with the McGeorge
Law Review) (scrutinizing several new policies implemented by the DJJ).
65. See JESSE JANNETTA ET AL., UC IRVINE CENTER FOR EVIDENCE-BASED CORRECTIONS, THE ROLE OF
THE DJJ IN THE CALIFORNIA JUVENILE JUSTICE SYSTEM 4 (2007).
66. See Major Cases and Achievements, PRISON LAW OFFICE (2015), available at http://www.prisonlaw.
com/cases.php (on file with the McGeorge Law Review).
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facilities. The court experts worked closely with DJJ managers, as well as
consultants from Orbis Associates, faculty at the University of California
campuses at Davis and Irvine, and the University of Cincinnati, to build the
68
IBTM. Representatives of the Prison Law Office were intimately involved in
the review and definition of the new IBTM.
The first important element of the IBTM was to implement a validated risk
and needs assessment system to inform case plans. Next, DJJ staff needed to
develop a comprehensive case management process and train those staff who
would fulfill this function. The case planning process would logically lead to DJJ
youngsters being assigned to evidence-based interventions, both group sessions
and one-on-one counseling. The IBTM envisioned that case plans would be
updated at regular intervals and would help support subsequent reentry planning.
Another critical element of the IBTM were clear policies to respond to youth
conduct, with both appropriate negative sanctions and a system of positive
incentives or rewards for youth who were actively participating in rehabilitation
and educational programming. The older behavior management system was “all
sticks and few carrots.” Staff needed to embrace a different viewpoint that valued
positive reinforcements for youth rather than the routine reliance on punishment
and deprivation of basic services. The new theory of the IBTM envisioned youth
going through a series of stages as they progressed towards returning to their
communities. Staff at several facilities started up incentive programs that
encouraged young people to strive for pro-social behavior and attitudes.
The IBTM was a giant step forward for the DJJ, which had not stayed current
with the latest research and evidence on what worked to reform chronic and
violent youthful offenders. However, it was not enough to just have a set of
written policies that articulated the goals and objectives of the IBTM. It was
imperative that the leadership of the DJJ, the facility superintendents, the middle
managers, and direct-care staff understand and embrace the new approach. High
quality training was required for all staff in many areas that were essential to the
success of the IBTM. Further, the IBTM needed clear metrics so that managers
and the Farrell and internal monitors could assess progress of individual youth,
particular living units, and facilities. Staff buy-in and willingness to try new
interventions were very important. Cynicism and poor staff morale had to be
overcome if the new IBTM was to live.
The evolution of the IBTM was a very difficult and time-consuming struggle
that surfaced fundamental issues of trust and cooperation among various DJJ
staff. There were myriads of concrete policy decisions that had to be made after

67. See Ninth Report of the Special Master at 13, Farrell v. Cate, No. RG 03079344, (Cal. Super. Ct.,
Alameda Cnty. June 2009), available at http://www.prisonlaw.com/pdfs/OSM9.pdf (on file with the McGeorge
Law Review).
68. See id.
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appropriate staff input. For several months the IBTM was more a “paper tiger”
than a real reform, although that situation changed. The DJJ needed to reevaluate
staffing needs to make the IBTM a reality and all levels of personnel from youth
corrections officers, to counselors, mental health professionals, and
administrative and support personnel needed to prepare for changed job
descriptions and changing work relationships. More will be said later about the
strategies employed by the DJJ to move the IBTM from theory to reality and the
continuing challenges to fully actualizing the IBTM.
Part of the IBTM was a significant upgrading of the treatment services
available to youngsters. In the past, a very large number of rehabilitation
programs would be started and ended without a thorough analysis of whether
69
these efforts were successful. Individual staff would start up groups and
introduce treatment curriculum, but these were delivered on an erratic basis.
Programs were often responsive to various fads like “tough love,” “the inner
wounded child,” “scared straight,” and “correctional boot camps” or to outside
70
vendors who sought to sell curriculum materials to the DJJ. There were many
discrete programs tried but no evidence that any one of these interventions had
the proper “dosage” to produce positive outcomes. No one seemed interested in
whether the young people found value in these programs. Too often, “treatment”
meant sitting in your room for hours and filling out a workbook that might be
looked at some point by staff.
One of the most significant positive reforms was that the DJJ chose to
implement a limited set of interventions that possessed very strong research
71
support. Moreover, the unproven efforts were gradually phased out.
Consultants, especially from the University of Cincinnati, helped DJJ staff focus
72
on fidelity to the details of the treatment models. A process of ongoing
assessment of the selected treatment programs was instituted. Most importantly,
treatment became more interactive and allowed for greater communication and
connections among DJJ young people and staff.
Another area of very encouraging reform was improvement of DJJ processes
to protect youth rights. Placing great value on fairness in dealing with youth was

69. See MARK W. LIPSEY, CTR. FOR JUVENILE JUST. REFORM, IMPROVING THE EFFECTIVENESS OF
JUVENILE JUSTICE PROGRAMS 7 (Dec. 2010), available at http://cjjr.georgetown.edu/pdfs/ebp/ebppaper.pdf (on
file with the McGeorge Law Review) (discussing the lack of analysis of whether rehabilitation treatments were
effective).
70. See id. (noting the rise in popularity of boot camps, Scared Straight programs, and a generally tougher
approach).
71. See The Long and Winding Road, supra note 23, at 10.
72. See Program Design, UNIV. OF CINCINNATI CORR. INST. (2014), http://www.uc.edu/corrections/
services/program-design.html (on file with the McGeorge Law Review) (indicating that the University of
Cincinnati collaborated with the DJJ to improve the effectiveness of juvenile justice in California).

791

2014 / Reforming the Division of Juvenile Justice
73

a vital part of the Farrell consent agreement. Upgrading protections for youth
was very important to the overall treatment mission and caused a fundamental
shift in staff culture.
DJJ rewrote the Youth Rights Manual and paid special attention to the needs
of youngsters with disabilities. Eventually the DJJ labored to make sure that the
written products were “user friendly” and available to the youngsters on their
living units. Another major area of improvement was a refinement and
clarification of the due process afforded to youth at disciplinary hearings and in
determinations about program alterations, especially the process that assigned
youth to BTPs and other limited programming units. DJJ also developed clear
and consistent criteria and a thoughtful process to decide whether youngsters
74
committing very serious infractions should be subject to criminal charges.
At the beginning of the Farrell case, the grievance and complaint process for
youth was completely dysfunctional. In the 1970s, California was recognized as a
75
national leader in advancing appropriate youth rights. Federal legislation such
as the Civil Rights of Institutionalized Persons Act (CRIPA) was strongly
76
influenced by many policies and practices of the California Youth Authority.
The DJJ revamped the entire grievance process and retrained staff in new
procedures. There were also several external and internal audits of the grievance
system that led to further refinements. Over time, the number of youth grievances
declined precipitously and the remaining youth complaints were handled in a
timely manner. Problems of staff manipulation of the grievance process were
curtailed, and youth and staff were encouraged to resolve minor issues on an
informal basis so as to build more trust between them.
Prominently displayed in every living unit was basic information about the
grievance process, access to the ombudsperson, opportunities for religious
services, and timely access to health care. DJJ eventually agreed to provide more
opportunities for its youth to regularly confer with lawyers and community youth
advocates. Youngsters were given briefings about the impact of federal laws such
as the Americans with Disability Act (ADA), the Individuals with Disabilities
77
Education Act (IDEA), and the Prison Rape Elimination Act (PREA). The
78
youth were also informed about the requirements of the Farrell consent decree.

73. See Consent Decree, supra note 13, at 5–10 (discussing the steps taken to ensure fairness in dealings
with youth in the juvenile justice system).
74. See KRISBERG ET AL., supra note 4, at 5.
75. The Long and Winding Road, supra note 23, at 1.
76. See id. (describing professionals coming to California to learn more about its practices and policies).
77. See CAL. DEP’T OF CORR. & REHAB., YOUTH BILL OF RIGHTS (2014) (stating that youth have the right
to a comprehensive orientation detailing all of their legal rights under the ADA, the IDEA, and all other
legislation affecting them).
78. See id. (listing the right to a comprehensive orientation detailing all legal rights of youth, which
includes the rights detailed in the Farrell Consent Decree).
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Staff also received this training and they were sensitized to the renewed and
enhanced DJJ focus of fairness and consistency in its dealing with youngsters and
with their families. Discussions of these issues were often integrated into the
large groups held in the living units each morning. Not surprisingly, some staff
objected to the heightened attention to youth rights, but their opposition
diminished over time. The role of top leadership in explicitly supporting the
renewed direction on youth rights was crucial.
The Farrell consent decree placed a strong emphasis on involving families in
the care and rehabilitation of DJJ youth. Support for this idea had been
traditionally limited among DJJ managers and staff, although there were some
superintendents who pushed this concept. Many staff assumed that the youth
suffered from the abuse and criminal activities of their parents and guardians, so
79
greater involvement with “negative” adults made no sense them.
Over time, with training and coaching, this anti-family bias was greatly
diminished. Each facility assigned a person to be the family involvement
coordinator, the number of visiting hours was expanded, and visiting times were
lengthened. The DJJ even experimented with video conferencing to help youth
keep in contact with parents and guardians who lived very far from the
institutions. Each facility began organizing family days for those youth who were
doing the best in their education and programming. The family days often
involved special activities that allowed the youth and their families to enjoy more
normalized interactions. The visiting rooms were redecorated to minimize the
jail-like atmosphere of the institutions and create a welcoming environment. Staff
were asked to attend the family days so that they could give the parents an update
on how their children were progressing. The DJJ tracked the visiting process and
tried to remove barriers to youngsters who wanted to connect with their families.
The DJJ has made impressive progress in implementing a new reentry
process for its youth. The best research makes clear that quality reentry planning
80
and support are closely linked to reducing recidivism. Historically, the DJJ had
81
a parole division that was responsible for youth who exited its facilities. In
2010, the Legislature eliminated parole services within the DJJ and transferred
82
this responsibility to the counties. Under SB 1628, the DJJ discharges youth
83
back to the county of commitment. While the state gives localities some funding

79. See CHRISOTPHER MURRAY ET AL., supra note 48, at 62 (discussing the importance of family
involvement in the rehabilitation process).
80. ELIZABETH SEIGLE, NAT’L REENTRY RES. CTR., CORE PRINCIPLES FOR REDUCING RECIDIVISM AND
IMPROVING OTHER OUTCOMES FOR YOUTH IN THE JUVENILE JUSTICE SYSTEM 36 (2014) (discussing the
importance of reentry planning).
81. History of the DJJ supra note 30.
82. Id.
83. See CAL. DEP’T OF CORR. & REHAB., CORRECTIONS YEAR AT A GLANCE 32–33 (2011) (stating that
counties have the responsibility of parole services pursuant to SB 1628).
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for the aftercare function, it is less than was previously allocated to DJJ parole,
and counties were given little or no direction on how to best organize aftercare
programs. There were numerous reports of prior DJJ youngsters who were
homeless, unemployed, or drifting without assistance. Former DJJ young people
who needed medical care, especially medication, found these services difficult to
obtain.
Staff with the DJJ decided to “step into the gap” by designing an internally
delivered reentry and aftercare program, led by a designated reentry specialist at
each DJJ facility. The protocol for this program is very detailed and
comprehensive.
The reentry specialists help youth prepare for their hearing before the
Juvenile Parole Board and even invite Parole Board members to hold seminars
for youth on the release process. Each youth develops an individual aftercare
plan with the assistance of the reentry specialist and this plan actively involves
84
the youth’s family members when possible. The plan includes goals in the
sectors of housing, education, and employment, as well as helps the youth
85
identify local resources to continue work on personal issues after release.
Aftercare preparation also includes helping the youngsters obtain a valid driver’s
license or ID, registering the young person to vote, and signing them up for
Social Security, state disability and unemployment benefits, and the Covered
86
California health program.
The reentry specialist works with the youth to help them clear up outstanding
legal challenges such as warrants, unpaid victim restitution or court costs, and
ICE holds. Where possible, the DJJ aftercare planning and actions are
coordinated with county probation officials where the youth will eventually
reside.
This aftercare work is very labor intensive and demands that the reentry
specialists are committed to “go the extra mile” to make in-person or phone
contacts and to smooth the transition process as much as possible. The youth
report that they greatly value these services and the net public benefits should be
realized in terms of fewer young people being rearrested or incarcerated in the
future.
V. THE UNFINISHED REFORM AGENDA
Reforming the DJJ is very much a “work in progress.” Many of the excellent
changes discussed above are not finished but are clearly headed in the right
direction. More importantly, it is clear that virtually all of the top leadership,

84. See id.
85. CHRISOTPHER MURRAY ET AL.,, supra note 48, at 55.
86. See id. at 56.
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middle managers, and a majority of the direct-line staff have embraced this new
direction for the DJJ.
The current DJJ staff that I interviewed said that they now realized that the
reform process would never be completed. They reported that the agency was
committed to a constant process of learning about the latest research and best
practices, attempting to implement those new ideas, and measuring the results.
Ongoing and expanded staff training was seen as a key agenda item for the
future.
Other of my interviewees suggested that more progress needed to be
achieved in reducing the negative influence of gangs in the DJJ. The DJJ is still
in the very nascent stages of a revamped gang intervention model. There has
been affirmative progress to improve mental health services but there was broad
agreement that more progress was needed.
Several of those interviewed raised concerns about the old and crumbling
facilities that were not designed to create a very effective treatment milieu. The
“useful life” of the older places such as OHCYCF and VYCF was judged to be
not very much longer. Few in the DJJ felt that there would be additional
investments in the facilities by the Governor or the Legislature. The best guess is
that the worst problems in DJJ infrastructure be repaired and efforts will be made
to humanize the current facilities. It was hoped that future elected officials would
tackle the replacement of DJJ institutions. Many of those interviewed called for
reducing the size of the living units even further than the Farrell limits and
further enhancing the ratio of treatment staff to youth.
The OSM and court experts pointed to further reforms needed in the
implementation of the IBTM. Training in all of the core ingredients of the IBTM
still required a more diversified and intensive outreach to staff. In particular, it
was noted that there was a need for the top managers to more fully understand
the IBTM. There was support for the IBTM in theory, but it was felt that top
leadership needed to increase their knowledge and ability to train and mentor
others.
Some of the weakest links in the IBTM implementation process were needed
improvements and simplification of the needs assessment process and
improvements in staff ability to deliver high quality cognitive behavioral training
and anger management groups.
A new substance abuse program was piloted from December 2012 to May
87
2013. In September 2013, the DJJ conducted training for trainers with staff who

87. See CAL. DEP’T OF CORR. & REHAB., THE YEAR IN ACCOMPLISHMENTS 15 (2012) (discussing the
new substance abuse program).
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completed the pilot. The substance program was implemented statewide in
88
December 2013, with the first cycle completed in June 2014.
Staff need more training in the operational details of the case management
and better tracking of treatment resources for individual youth. Several of those
that I interviewed stressed the need for a better integration within the IBTM of
counselors, educators, and mental health staff. The incentive process and the
reinforcement system have really just been launched and there is need for more
practicing and adjustments of this core component of the IBTM. Some DJJ staff
urged that there should be more opportunities created for youth to play positive
leadership roles in a wide range of DJJ programs and services.
DJJ is making admirable steps forward to reintroduce reentry services and to
better prepare youth for successful return home. Reentry services must begin
earlier in the DJJ process and be tightly connected to the IBTM. Some of my
interviewees suggested that the length of stay in DJJ should be shortened further
and that there is need for less secure housing options for those youngsters
approaching release.
The OSM, the plaintiffs’ lawyers, and most of the court experts believe that
the DJJ should further restrict and, perhaps, eliminate the use of chemical
restraints—at least for the mentally ill youth or in single-youth incidents that
89
presented no imminent threats to the life and safety of youth and staff.
The youth advocates called for better access of the DJJ residents to legal
90
advisors on a range of topics. They also called for continued improvements in
the grievance process and the ability of young people to get their concerns heard
91
and acted upon.
Moreover, most of the interviewees were concerned about sustaining the
progress made in the DJJ into the future. There were worries that future statewide
elected officials would abandon the reforms based on public fears about youth
crime and violence: What if youth arrests started to increase? It was also
expressed that future state budget problems might put closing down the DJJ back
on the table. These DJJ close observers stressed the need for current leadership to
aggressively broadcast the “good news story” about the DJJ changes.
Most of those that I spoke with urged that there be stronger coalitions
established with county juvenile and criminal justice officials, who should be
88. See id. (indicating the implementation of the new evidence-based substance abuse program and
discussing it generally).
89. See The Long and Winding Road, supra note 23, at 8–9 (discussing chemical restraints as a disfavored
approach).
90. See RICHARD A. MENDEL, ANNIE E. CASEY FOUND., NO PLACE FOR KIDS: THE CASE FOR REDUCING
JUVENILE INCARCERATION 5–6 (2011), available at http://www.aecf.org/m/resourcedoc/aecf-NoPlace
ForKidsFullReport-2011.pdf (on file with the McGeorge Law Review) (discussing, as an advocate for juvenile
prisoners, the problematic lack of access to attorneys).
91. See id. (discussing, as an advocate, the ineffectiveness of the grievance process).
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very invested in the continuation of a successful state juvenile corrections
agency. It was recommended that the DJJ could offer training and technical
assistance to counties in effective policies and practices to treat and educate the
most troubled young people. The media and civic groups should be cultivated as
powerful allies of the DJJ. The research community should be encouraged to
evaluate the effects of various aspects of the DJJ.
A different aspect of sustaining the reforms is to cultivate the next generation
of DJJ leadership. Due to state personnel rules, many current DJJ leaders will
retire in the next five years or less. The DJJ needs to design and implement a
process to identify the potential future facility and statewide leaders. There
should be high quality training for this next generation of leaders in the latest
research and also the best methods to institute and maintain progressive reforms.
University-based programs in public policy and management should be asked to
assist in this endeavor.
VI. HOW THE DRAMATIC DJJ REFORMS WERE ACHIEVED?
“I get by with a little help from my friends.”
Moving from the fairly objective recounting of what occurred, we redirect
the narrative to the more subjective and judgmental analysis to identify what led
to the successful transformation of the DJJ. Reasonable and knowledgeable
observers are likely to disagree about the right ingredients of the “reform stew.”
Interestingly, there was, in fact, remarkable consensus among the diverse
interviewees that I polled as to what helped DJJ move from being one of the
worst juvenile corrections agencies to one of the better ones.
The push for major change in the DJJ came initially from a dedicated group
of youth advocates who raised grave concerns about the decline of the California
92
youth corrections system in the 1990s and the early years of the 21st Century.
This group included organizations such as Books Not Bars, the Haywood Burns
Institute, the Center on Juvenile and Criminal Justice, the Commonweal Institute,
the National Council on Crime and Delinquency, the National Youth Law
Center, the Youth Law Center, and the Youth Justice Institute. Relying on
research and policy viewpoints from federal agencies and other states, these
advocates documented the deterioration of DJJ programs and services. Their
vocal critiques of the DJJ convinced many in the media and, more importantly in
93
the Legislature, that urgent actions were required.

92. See KRISBERG ET AL., supra note 4 at 5 (noting the advocacy groups that pushed for change in the
juvenile justice system).
93. See id. at 2–3 (discussing the role of advocacy groups in initiating the reform process).
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The calls for reform were mostly ignored by the DJJ and the state youth
agency hunkered down to defend its tenuous status quo. The proponents of
reform pointed to very high rates of recidivism, the growing length of stay of DJJ
youngsters that exceeded that of any other state, serious crowding, reports of high
levels of institutional violence, and the escalating costs of operating the state
94
facilities. Because the advocates were given very limited access to DJJ facilities
or data, they often relied on stories that were told by former residents and staff of
the state juvenile facilities.
In 2000, the newly established Office of the Inspector General (OIG)
conducted a series of investigations of the DJJ in the wake of a series of suicides
95
and riots at several facilities. The OIG pointed to problems of rampant gang
violence in the facilities, the prevalence of drugs and other contraband in the
facilities, frequent use of solitary confinement, and excessive UOF that bordered
96
on torture of some DJJ youth. The OIG noted evidence of the breakdowns in
health care, mental health, and education services. These OIG reports received
little immediate action by Governor Gray Davis, but he did appoint new
97
leadership for DJJ.
The Legislature, under the guidance of Senator Gloria Romero, held a series
98
of high profile hearings based on the OIG reports. The U.S. DOJ Special
Litigation Unit conducted a special inquiry into the treatment of youth at
99
NACYCF.
Simultaneously, the Youth Law Center filed successful lawsuits challenging
the absence of adequate on-site health care services and major deficiencies in
100
special education and DJJ school programs. While these cases took years to
resolve, the litigation opened up the agency to levels of outside scrutiny that were
not previously possible. In 2003 the Prison Law Office (PLO) filed a
101
comprehensive lawsuit covering virtually all aspects of the DJJ. The PLO had
achieved great success in its challenges to the conditions of confinement in the
94. CHRISTOPHER MURRAY ET AL., supra note 48, at 1.
95. See, e.g., STEVE WHITE, OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GEN., MANAGEMENT REVIEW AUDIT: HERMAN G.
STARK YOUTH CORRECTIONAL FACILITY 3 (2000); see also Joint Oversight Hearing of the Senate and
Assembly Committees on Public Safety Regarding the California Department of the Youth Authority, 2000
Leg. Sess. (Cal. 2000) (testimony of Steve White on the findings of the Office of the Inspector General).
96. WHITE, supra note 95, at 10, 32, 39.
97. Beth Shuster & Tina Daunt, An Intense Nominee for Youth Authority, L.A. TIMES (Mar. 30, 2000),
http://articles.latimes.com/print/2000/mar/30/news/mn-14285 (on file with the McGeorge Law Review).
98. See KRISBERG ET AL., supra note 4, at 14 (noting that Senator Romero held several hearings on the
issue).
99. U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE ACTIVITIES UNDER THE CIVIL RIGHTS OF
INSTITUTIONALIZED PERSONS ACT FISCAL YEAR 2003 at 11 (2004), available at http://www.justice.
gov/crt/about/spl/documents/split_cripa04.pdf (on file with the McGeorge Law Review).
100. See, e.g., Morris v. Harper, 94 Cal. App. 4th 52 (2001) (involving a plaintiff represented by the
Youth Law Center).
101. See Consent Decree, supra note 13, at 1 (noting that the suit was filed by the Prison Law Office).
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state prisons and enjoyed strong credibility in the Governor’s office and the
Attorney General’s office. The litigation was settled and the parties negotiated a
detailed set of remedial plans and the Court appointed a Special Master and
Court Experts to monitor the remedial agreements. Most of those interviewed for
this paper asserted that the lawsuit was a necessary, but not sufficient, force for
reform. These interviewees felt that meaningful reforms would have taken
decades to achieve without the lawsuit. Further, the lawyers at the PLO were
genuinely improving the lives of young people in the DJJ. They could navigate
the delicate and complex role of lawyers for troubled youth—what national youth
law expert Mark Soler referred to as being both “warriors and healers.” The PLO
was firm in its focus on implementing the Farrell orders, but it evidenced great
flexibility and the ability to collaborate and compromise. PLO attorneys Donald
Specter and Sara Norman were “hands on” reformers who got to know and
appreciate the staff and youth in the DJJ.
The Farrell consent decree allowed the DJJ to request substantial additional
funds from the Legislature at a time of overall state budget austerity. The consent
decree established a clear structure that defined the outcomes to be achieved and
timetables for progress. Moreover, the lawsuit resulted in a mechanism of outside
accountability that included the judge, who played a very active role in the case,
the plaintiffs’ attorneys, the Special Master, and the court experts. These
individuals conducted regular monitoring site visits to all DJJ facilities,
assembled massive amounts of information about DJJ operations, and generated
public reports on the evolving conditions of the state juvenile facilities.
For its part, the DJJ needed to create an internal cadre of managers who
would track the reforms and generate internal and external assessments of
progress. Attorneys for the parties, the OSM, and the court experts conferred on a
weekly basis and there were settlement compliance conferences before the judge
on a quarterly basis. These byproducts of the Farrell case created a new level of
transparency and accountability that supported the change process. Reports
authored by the OSM and the court experts, as well as court hearings, were open
to the public and generated additional media coverage about the conditions in the
102
DJJ and the challenges faced by its youthful residents.
The lawsuit also offered state officials political cover as they liberalized and
humanized the conditions and programs within the DJJ. The more conventional
“tough on crime” voices were still powerful in the DJJ, the media, and the
Legislature. However, the Farrell consent decree allowed the DJJ leadership to
argue that they had no choice in the matter. While the initial reforms may have
been based on the lawsuit, the current leadership and staff have shifted the

102. See id. at 2 (stating that expert reports were released to the general public).
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perspective towards viewing these changes as the right thing to do to achieve
better outcomes and to reduce recidivism for DJJ’s youth.
The Farrell consent decree introduced a set of nationally respected outsiders,
including the OSM and the court experts, who offered their experience and
103
knowledge of the latest research and professional opinions. Most importantly,
the DJJ did not have to search for a new mission and vision; the Farrell consent
decree provided the basic framework for the organization. The challenge for the
DJJ was to embrace that new philosophy at all levels of the organization and to
give it life.
The Legislature and the Governor also played a major role in the DJJ reforms
beyond providing additional funds. There were several major laws enacted that
104
dramatically reduced the DJJ population and ended severe crowding. These
legislative actions diverted large numbers of youth, especially non-violent
property and drug offenders, and parole violators, to local programs and
mandated the early discharge of some DJJ youth who had previously served their
entire statutory time in DJJ facilities. Other new laws reduced the use of “time
adds” by staff as punishment for youth and curbed some of the most arbitrary
105
decisions by the Juvenile Parole Board. The upper range to which youth could
106
be housed in DJJ was reduced from twenty-five to twenty-three years of age.
Moreover, the Legislature granted substantial funding to counties to manage
107
youth who were formerly sentenced to the DJJ. The most current research in
the field of juvenile justice suggested that a smaller and better resourced DJJ
108
would be less violence-prone and produce better outcomes for youth.
A. The Role of Leadership of DJJ
The CYA had been fortunate from its very creation of having outstanding
leadership. In particular, the former head of California’s juvenile corrections
agency, Allen Breed, was regarded as an internationally celebrated expert on
109
enlightened and progressive juvenile justice and corrections policy. But after
Allen Breed was appointed by President Jimmy Carter to run the National

103. See id. at 5 (noting not just the availability of experts and the special master, but also the mandate
that DJJ consult with them).
104. Burrell, supra note 15.
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. Patrick Bayer & David E. Pozen, The Effectiveness of Juvenile Correctional Facilities: Public
Versus Private, 48 J. L. & ECON. 549, 578 (2005).
109. Anna Benvenue, Turning Troubled Teens Into Career Criminals: Can California Reform the System
to Rehabilitate Its Youth Offenders, 38 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 33 (2008).
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Institute of Corrections, the leadership situation at CYA was never quite the
same.
From 1980 to 2014, there had been almost twenty formally appointed
110
directors or temporary heads of DJJ. Only a few of them had come up through
the CYA agency structure and possessed even basic preparation for the job. The
majority of those who joined the parade of DJJ leaders had backgrounds in
policing and adult corrections. They were often outsiders who had to win support
within the agency to accomplish their agendas. Few of them stayed around long
enough to establish a sustained leadership style and direction. Most of the staff
who observed this revolving door of directors assumed that more changes were
soon likely to occur and there was a reluctance to become too closely attached to
the current office holder. The ever-changing directorship reduced the clout and
credibility of the DJJ director in the Department of Finance, the Legislature, and
the broader juvenile justice professional world.
In 2010, CDCR Secretary Matthew Cate asked Michael Minor to assume the
leadership of DJJ. Minor had already completed a long career and was eligible to
retire. Director Minor had been promoted through various jobs as a Youth
Corrections Officer and Youth Corrections Counselor and was Chief of Security
111
at NACYCF during one of its most troubled periods. He also was assigned to
be the superintendent at several DJJ facilities, often after major problems had
overwhelmed others in leadership positions at those places. Immediately before
being named Director of DJJ, Minor was in charge of all of the DJJ facilities in
Northern California.
At the time of his interview with Secretary Cate, Michael Minor made clear
that he did not want to take on the assignment to shut down the DJJ. He shared
with the Secretary his support for the basic direction of the Farrell consent
decree and that CDCR maintain the organization. Director Minor was assured
that the goal was to make the DJJ a treatment model to be proud of, as well as
working to close the lawsuit. At the end of a distinguished career in corrections,
Minor said that he would rather “go fishing” than preside over a failed agency.
He convinced staff that “on his watch” there would be no more facility closures
and massive staff layoffs, factors that had created a sense of hopelessness among
staff and fear of future uncertainty for DJJ youngsters.
While there are volumes written about the attributes of leadership in the
public and private sector, there are a few major factors that are reiterated in these

110. History of the DJJ, supra note 30; DANIEL W. HANCOCK, LITTLE HOOVER COMM’N, JUVENILE
JUSTICE REFORM: REALIGNING RESPONSIBILITIES 2 (2008).
111. Bill Sessa, Legislature Confirms Mike Minor as DJJ Director, INSIDE CDCR NEWS (Feb. 26, 2013),
http://www.insidecdcr.ca.gov/2013/02/legislature-confirms-mike-minor-as-djj-director/ (on file with the
McGeorge Law Review).
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112

academic treatises. Great leaders are not just good managers—they possess a
vision of where they want to take the enterprise. Second, leaders inspire trust and
confidence in those around them and they can clearly articulate their vision.
Leaders are persuasive and can recruit others to their cause. Leaders know how to
delegate authority and hold others accountable. In the words of President Ronald
113
Reagan, they understand the dual principles of “trust but verify.”
Leaders are agile learners who quickly absorb and evaluate new information.
True leaders understand that organizational success is not the product of the
“great leader” but must be shared and celebrated with many employees. Most of
all, leaders are persistent and possess patience. They understand that fundamental
organizational transformations take time to realize and to be sustained. Great
leaders take their work very seriously but are humble and can listen to criticism
and disagreements without rancor. They are honest brokers who know how to
achieve effective compromises among people who must work together to
succeed.
Michael Minor possessed a natural instinct for almost all these traits of a
great leader. He had honed these leadership skills in a career at the CYA and the
DJJ. Moreover, he adapted his hands-on knowledge of the youngsters in the DJJ
and its staff to forge his own responses to the implementation of the Farrell
consent decree. He was a respected and experienced administrator who was
immediately present at all of the DJJ facilities to meet with youth and employees
to listen to their fears, concerns, and hopes for the future.
The Court, the OSM, and the court experts applauded the selection of Minor
as the DJJ’s director. They respected his intelligence, sincerity, and willingness
to absorb new ideas. He was not wedded to the “way that we have always done
things” mentality that had hamstrung the DJJ for several years after the Farrell
remedial plans were approved by the Court. Minor was an excellent and skillful
communicator who quickly established his bona fides in the Governor’s office,
the Legislature, and among important constituency groups. He projected a
willingness to learn and gave a fair hearing to conflicting views—but he also was
decisive and firm when critical decisions had to be made.
Virtually all of my interviewees gave ample credit to Minor for consolidating
past successes and accelerating momentum going forward. Some of his
management colleagues were careful not to diminish past DJJ leaders, but they
were very clear that Minor made a big difference in the pace and intensity of the
remedial plans.

112. TOM PETERS & ROBERT H. WATERMAN, IN SEARCH OF EXCELLENCE, LESSONS FROM AMERICA’S
BEST RUN COMPANIES NEW YORK CITY 169 (2006); PHILLIP SELZNICK, UNIV. OF CAL. BERKELEY,
LEADERSHIP IN ADMINISTRATION: A SOCIOLOGICAL INTERPRETATION 25–26, 28 (1984).
113. William D. Watson, Trust, but Verify: Reagan, Gorbachev, and the INF Treaty, 5 HILLTOP REV. 22,
38 (2011).
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B. Other Strategies for Making the Farrell Remedial Plans a Reality
Central to Minor’s leadership style was his ability to identify top managers
from within the organization and permit them to translate the broad contours of
reform into the discrete operational details of the facilities. Directors of the DJJ
in the recent past had relied heavily on outside consultants and their colleagues
from other states. Michael Minor focused his trust on small cadre of experienced
insider staff that he had known over the years. These strategic-staff middle
managers brought with them detailed knowledge of how the DJJ functioned on a
daily operational basis. These management allies were generally supportive of
the new reform direction, but could also politely confront the OSM and court
experts if they believed that some of the new concepts were unworkable. Many
of this core team had begun their careers at the DJJ as direct-care workers,
counselors, or corrections officers. They were skillful at convincing the
remaining direct-care workers that the changed policies and practices would
neither endanger the youth or their co-workers, and they were excellent at
translating the general road map of the consent decree to specific implementation
activities and systems. The DJJ is a para-military structured bureaucracy and
does best when the details are specified in advance and staff can rely on clearly
defined processes and channels of authority to accomplish their tasks.
The new management staff created a strong sense of continuity and
credibility of the reform agenda with the agency’s past. They were trusted by
fellow staff and could leverage longstanding positive work relationships to enlist
others in their mission. They understood the daily challenges faced by the frontline staff and could also anticipate problems. It was very helpful to have a core
group of top staff that possessed extensive experience in basic details such as
budget development, procurement of needed services, hiring, union requirements,
and personnel rules.
Virtually all of my interviewees from within the DJJ placed great value on
the expertise and skill of this new management team. This group was credited
with accelerating the pace of reform and winning over other DJJ staff to the
changes. This group was the central strategy by which DJJ top managers
achieved widespread buy-in with the Farrell reforms, and they were instrumental
in modeling the new DJJ culture.
While sometimes teamed up with the OSM, the court experts and a limited
number of outsiders, such as the group from the University of Cincinnati, the
inner management group provided most of the training of other staff in the new
methods. They became versed in the central elements of the IBTM and provided
strategic coaching to others. Director Minor relied on this group to develop
measures of the success of various reform components and this group worked
alongside the court experts and OSM to audit the Farrell mandates.
The management team described above led pivotal reform components, such
as revising the UOF process, minimizing the use of limited programs,
803

2014 / Reforming the Division of Juvenile Justice
establishing new “business rules” governing staffing patterns, and substantially
recreating the DJJ approach to gang behavior in its facilities. These managers
made frequent onsite visits to facilities to confer with the local management staff
and gauge the obstacles to achieving the Farrell remedial plans. These
headquarters staff would work together with the facility staff to design
“corrective action plans” to advance the reforms in instances in which there were
major issues standing in the way.
Other essential people in the reform process were the facility superintendents
and local top managers. The uneven success of the Farrell remedial plans at
different DJJ facilities was directly related to the knowledge and skill of the local
leaders to translate the plans into daily activities. The facilities at the OHCYCF
and NACYCF emerged as the leading edge of the reforms; the VYCF
experienced great difficulties in managing change. Leadership at the northern
facility complex had all worked together in very collaborative and positive
manners with each other and with the new headquarters team. At the VYCF,
several of the superintendents were replaced after laudable efforts by
headquarters to improve their performance. Managers at the VYCF expressed
strong verbal support for the headquarters policy directives, but compliance was
often superficial or token. The level of trust between the southern facility
complex and DJJ headquarters had been problematic for years.
Minor and his team began to spend substantial time at the VYCF. They
participated in training, mentoring, and auditing the operations there. The short
travel distance from Sacramento to Stockton made interaction with managers at
the OHCYCF and the NACYCF relatively easy; whereas being present at the
VYCF meant flying down to the Los Angeles area and often staying there for
several days. Early attempts by headquarters to stay connected to the managers at
the VYCF relied on emails and voice and video conferencing. These methods
proved of only limited value. In recent months, Director Minor replaced the
superintendent at the VYCF with a member of his close-in management team.
Other members of that team continue to work at VYCF on a regular basis. This
enhanced effort at better direct communication and joint problem-solving
between headquarters and facility staff has produced substantial progress in
meeting benchmarks of the Farrell remedial plans, especially in the areas of
reducing UOF, eliminating the use of solitary confinement, and reducing room
confinement. The OSM and the court experts have also devoted a substantial
amount of hours to auditing and increasing the level of fidelity with the core
elements of the IBTM at VYCF.
There are two additional strategies that were mentioned by the persons that I
interviewed. First, the DJJ utilized the approach of pilot testing some of the
large-scale reforms before rolling these out statewide. The use of testing and
refinements was especially important for the more complex changes required in
the areas of the Sex Offender Behavior Treatment Program, the IBTM, and
improvements in the education and mental care sectors.
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Earlier DJJ administrators were determined to implement large scale changes
at every facility simultaneously. They felt that it was problematic to continue the
old practices with a large segment of the youth population. Further, there was
perceived pressure to show results in light of the substantial budget
enhancements given to the DJJ. It was all possible that the rapid implementation
of Farrell reforms would blunt the ongoing calls among youth advocates to close
down the entire youth corrections system.
This aggressive approach to reform was not very successful. Instead, the DJJ
employed a tactic of piloting some of the largest innovations—first in a single
living unit, next in a series of other living units, and eventually moving to a
second facility. The pilots were begun at the OHCYCF, which was judged to be
most in tune in the philosophy of the Farrell reforms and where there had been a
tradition of strong local management.
The pilot approach had major advantages. Primarily, it permitted the DJJ to
experiment with different methods and evaluate the strengths and weaknesses of
various aspects of the program and policy design. The pilot approach created a
group of staff who had actually lived with the new program and could be used as
effective trainers of other staff. Piloting allowed for rapid modifications in the
policies and procedures being tested on a small scale. Moreover, the piloting
strategy allowed the DJJ to move forward without having to be completely
blocked by existing union work rules and agreements. While the pilot testing
approach may have slowed the initial realization of some of the Farrell reforms,
this strategy made the expansion of the reforms go more smoothly in the near
term.
Another strategy that proved very valuable was a decision initiated by the
OSM and endorsed by the court experts to conduct the auditing of the remedial
plans within a collaborative framework. The central idea was that the Farrell
consent decree required that the DJJ take over self-monitoring of the remedial
plan in the future. The joint audit teams were believed to create opportunities for
this handoff of responsibilities.
The joint auditing process was highly structured. Approximately 45 days
before a scheduled site visit to a facility, the DJJ audit team would provide a
detailed measurement of all the elements that required monitoring. This report
would include all of the backup data that were employed by the DJJ team to
make their conclusions. The court experts had already explained to the DJJ
auditors the nature of the evidence that was required.
The OSM and the court expert would review these pre-audit materials and
request additional information as needed. These pre-audit reports were closely
scrutinized for areas of partial or non-compliance, as well as for the reasons
given for less than full compliance. The court expert would sample the data for
areas deemed to be in full compliance to double check the quality of the internal
DJJ audits. Over time, the court experts would also examine changes in ratings
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and the rationale for these changes. The internal auditors, the OSM, and the court
expert would confer about the pre-audits in advance of the site visits.
The collaborative audit teams would be on-site for the actual audits. At this
time, supplemental data was collected and additional interviews were conducted
with staff and the court expert, and OSM interviewed a significant sample of DJJ
youngsters and staff. All open living units were visually inspected by the audit
team. An informal written and oral briefing was given to the facility mangers and
to headquarters staff shortly after the onsite work was completed. Later, the OSM
and the court expert filed a formal audit report and received feedback from the
plaintiffs’ and defendant’s legal representatives, as well as other members of the
DJJ management team.
The process produced a very significant level of agreement among the
agency auditor and the outside Farrell monitors. Most importantly, the joint audit
process allowed members of the team to learn from each other’s diverse
experiences and areas of expertise. This solidified the goal of working together to
successfully meet all of the requirements of the Farrell consent decree. It
fostered a spirit of candid communication and a sincere effort to consider many
perspectives within the implementation process. Many great ideas surfaced for
improving the quality of the audits, and there were agreements that some very
complex areas, such as improvements in the review of UOF, the grievance
system, and the care of disabled youth, would demand follow-ups and more indepth monitoring.
In general, the joint teams worked very well together. In some of the highly
specialized areas involved in the auditing of health care and education issues
there was a need for the court experts to play a larger role in the initial
assessments. This process worked well and permitted a very efficient handoff of
the primary auditing role to the Office of Audits and Court Compliance, with the
proviso that the parties, the OSM, or the court experts could play a larger role in
the monitoring process as needed in the future.
C. Great Ideas Whose Results Were Underwhelming
Not every reform strategy meets its expected goals, even if those ideas that
would appear obvious. I asked each of my interviewees to tell me what “great
ideas” did not pan out or failed to meet their expectations. Sometimes these
concepts came directly from the consent decree and other times the reform
activities were promoted by the parties, the OSM, or the court experts. When the
results were less than expected, the DJJ often revamped its approach in these
areas. There was remarkable consensus among the people with whom I talked
about the ineffective change models.
The interviewees explained that they had all assumed that the massive input
of staff training on a wide range of pertinent topics would advance the Farrell
reforms. Indeed the remedial plans specified a tremendous amount of new
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training for virtually all DJJ staff that was to be delivered very quickly. At the
beginning of the Farrell case, training was primarily offered by a joint academy
with CDCR and was almost exclusively focused on security and safety issues. It
was assumed that training in a range of treatment techniques per se was a key to
reform.
Initially the DJJ struggled with the pure logistics of scheduling and
organizing these training sessions. Training was offered at a central location and
staff had to adjust work schedules to facilitate the absence of staff that were
undergoing the training. Further, the quality of the training was, at best, uneven.
Also, staff were frustrated because they were being prepared for programs and
systems that did not yet exist and might not be operational for years. Moreover,
staff promotions, transfers, and retirements meant that many of the staff who had
these costly educational experiences were no longer functioning in the jobs for
which they were being prepared. Agency policies and procedures were in flux
and not entirely consistent with the training being offered. Supervisors were not
organized to reinforce and model the principles of training in daily activities.
The training was scattershot without a planned approach to how and when
the training should be delivered. The DJJ has now moved to establishing a clear
training plan with realistic timetables. The DJJ is also working to see that the
training is delivered proximate to the time when new programs and policies are
introduced. The DJJ is relying less on the joint CDCR academy and is utilizing
its own internal training staff. Outside substantive consultants are required to use
a “training for trainers” format so that DJJ staff become more comfortable and
experienced in the core training areas. Also, the DJJ has learned the need for top
administrators and mid-level managers to learn the materials before it is
presented to a larger number of front-line personnel. It is also very beneficial to
deliver more interdisciplinary training experiences that include education, health,
and mental health care personnel, along with security staff. The list of areas for
training has been streamlined and scheduling of various training is more closely
aligned to the schedule guiding the implementation of the component of the
remedial plan. The DJJ is revising its training method to be more participatory
and less didactic. New ways of assessing the achievement of learning objectives
will include a major focus on demonstrating mastery of the content and skills, not
just the number of staff who put their names on sign-up sheets.
Another area of very limited returns for the reforms was the amount of time
devoted to disagreements over the proper risk and needs assessment system to
adopt. There were also weeks spent on a lack of consensus, including the exact
treatment curriculum to use as part of the IBTM. Initially, the DJJ relied on
outside consultants and a small group of managers to specify its version of the
IBTM. Several of the court experts felt left out of this process and felt that the
choices made by the DJJ leadership were not the best ones. After months of work
by the DJJ and its consultants, there was only the skimpiest written description of
the IBTM.
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The court experts demanded a fuller, research-based model, together with an
operations manual and training curriculum for the IBTM. The plaintiffs’ lawyers
asked for an order for the court experts and the DJJ to deliver the design of the
IBTM and the related implementation tool. The judge helped negotiate an
apparent agreement in which the court experts and their staff worked with the
DJJ to produce the requested IBTM materials. This joint drafting team could
never reach consensus and months went by with little or no progress seen on the
IBTM.
The product of the joint group was very vague and generic in its tone.
Responding with extreme frustration, the parties and the court returned to the
original plan that the DJJ would author the IBTM design with input from the
court experts and the OSM. The lengthy dispute weakened whatever trust may
have existed among the parties and the court experts and finally led to the
resignation of the Special Master and two of the court experts. This “era of bad
feelings and bruised egos” stalled the commencement of the IBTM for almost
two years.
In hindsight, this argument over the most proven evidence-based tools and
curriculum materials seems to have missed the essential spirit of the reforms. The
differences among competing assessment systems or treatment curriculum were
relatively small and unlikely to shape the overall direction of the Farrell reforms.
Moreover, this battle lost sight of the core principle that DJJ managers and staff
had to comprehend and embrace the reforms. The conflict delayed gaining staff
buy-in and stymied efforts to improve services for youth. In the end, the IBTM
model emerged out of a reading of the research literature, the treatment style that
best fit the DJJ management style, and the considerable adaptation and
refinement that happened as the IBTM was piloted in real living units with actual
DJJ young people.
Another early implementation dilemma was created as the parties negotiated
about staffing levels and the building of data-based accountability systems before
it was clear how the reforms would be fully implemented. This decision resulted
in the creation of large amounts of time devoted to documenting activities and
youth contacts. Staff complained that they were chained to their computers
entering information that might never be looked at, rather than increasing the
amount of time that staff could devote to one-on-one counseling and personal
interactions with the DJJ youngsters. There were also periods in which many new
staff were hired without a clear plan on how they would be utilized or how the
living unit teams would function. This drove up the per-youth costs of the DJJ
and raised questions as to whether the agency had “priced itself out of the
market.” As with training, more is not always better. A simple lesson of this
experience is to not staff up until you are clear about staff job descriptions and
responsibilities. Moreover, do not construct complex and difficult data collection
and reporting systems until you have specified the desired outcomes and agreed
on the appropriate metric for those outcomes.
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The levels of violence in the DJJ facilities seemed to decline as a direct result
of the living unit sizes being substantially decreased. Other remedial plan
components that set up “Violence Reduction Committees” had far less impact on
youth safety. For a time it appeared that almost every problem in the DJJ was met
with a special task force at headquarter or new committees at each facility. Over
time these committees met sporadically and included a number of surrogates for
the top managers. Staff devoted time to writing up the group deliberations, but
few important actions or changed practices emanated from the expanding number
of staff groups. In the end, the DJJ decided to combine and consolidate the work
of these staff committees.
While these good faith reform tactics never met their fullest potential, the
overall achievements at the DJJ were notable. Many of the key ingredients of
positive change did produce the desired results. In the best of cases, the time that
it takes to reshape a major state bureaucracy is considerable. But, some of the
organizational insights discussed by my interviewees might have shortened the
duration of the reform process. Major organizational reform does take
considerable patience, focus, and persistent leadership. The very complexity of
the enterprise and its perilous political context explain why these successes are
not witnessed very often.
VII. LESSONS LEARNED ABOUT REFORMING JUVENILE CORRECTIONS SYSTEMS
IN OTHER STATES
Besides the very substantial DJJ transformation, there are lessons to be
gleaned from parallel efforts in four states that were well documented by outside
researchers. I will briefly review the major findings of those case studies. It is
worth noting that most of the major findings of the case studies in these states are
mirrored in the observation and interviews describing the California success
story.
A. Closing the Massachusetts Reform Schools and Routinizing the Continuum of
Care
The most dramatic reform in the history of juvenile justice was the closure of
114
all of Massachusetts state juvenile facilities in the early 1970s. There had been
threats of federal investigation of the abuses in Massachusetts’s reform schools,
but this was an era before there were major civil rights challenges to juvenile
corrections. The strategy of change in the Bay State was the rapid closure of all
the state’s secure facilities and the transfer of youth to a diverse network of

114. JEROME MILLER, LAST ONE OVER THE WALL: THE MASSACHUSETTS EXPERIMENT IN CLOSING
REFORMS 116, 181 (1998).
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115

community-based placements and alternatives. This radical strategy was
adopted after more modest efforts to create therapeutic communities in the
reform schools were sabotaged by the corrections officer union. The
Massachusetts Division of Youth Services (DYS) Commissioner Jerome Miller
surrounded himself with a group of trusted top-level managers who helped plan
and execute the closures. Miller provided the broad vision and left the operation
116
details to his colleagues.
Miller was masterful at outreach to the media and to the most powerful
groups in the state. He enlisted the aid of professors at Harvard Law School, the
117
state bar association, influential women’s groups, and the Governor. He helped
the DYS youth tell their personal stories and elicited great sympathy for their
plight and maltreatment by the corrections officers. He was able to obtain a
substantial grant from the Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention
118
(OJJDP) to defray the initial costs of setting up the network of alternatives.
The dramatic closure of the reform schools led to a political reaction
designed to protect the jobs of traditional state employees and avert the closure of
facilities that were important to the economy of local communities. A new
Governor asked Miller to resign and many of the reforms were blunted by
119
legislative budget decisions and the opposition to reform of many of the judges.
Over the next decade, the DYS had a series of Commissioners who carefully
and deliberately moved the reforms forward. These later leaders of the DYS
brought with them strong political ties and detailed knowledge of the Legislature,
the judiciary, and the state budget process. There were also subsequent
Commissioners with very strong credentials in adult and youth corrections. These
corrections professionals introduced policies and practices that were consistent
with progressive thinking in the field, and they played down the political and
public confrontational style that was Miller’s forte.
Despite the reaction to the closures, Massachusetts did not reopen the older
reform schools and the state continued to focus its attention on strengthening the
community-based system. Research and evaluations supported the promising
results in the reshaped DYS and national foundations and OJJDP sought to
120
replicate the Massachusetts experiment.

115. Id. at 177, 181.
116. YITZHAK BAKAL, CLOSING CORRECTIONAL INSTITUTIONS: NEW STRATEGIES FOR YOUTH SERVICE
(1973).
117. MILLER, supra note 114, at 118.
118. Id. at 160.
119. Id. at 214.
120. JAMES AUSTIN ET AL., NAT’L COUNCIL ON CRIME & DELINQUENCY, UNLOCKING JUVENILE
CORRECTIONS: EVALUATING THE MASSACHUSETTS DEPARTMENT OF JUVENILE SERVICES (1991), available at
http://www.justice.gov/crt/about/spl/documents/split_cripa04.pdf (on file with the McGeorge Law Review).
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B. Creating and Sustaining the Missouri Model
One of the earliest replications of the Miller vision was in the Missouri
Division of Youth Services. There had been repeated investigations of child
121
abuse of the state’s reform school at Boonville. In 1983 the Legislature voted to
close Boonville and to move to a decentralized system of smaller facilities
122
emphasizing therapeutic interventions rather than harsh punishments. Youth in
the Missouri DYS lived in dormitories in facilities that resembled college
campuses, not jails. Missourians viewed their youthful residents as students and
citizens, not prison inmates. Over the next several years, the “Missouri Model”
became the desired template for enlightened juvenile corrections practice.
A major reason for the sustained success of the Missouri DYS reforms was
the political skill of its leader, Mark Steward, who built a strong and steadfast
constituency for reform among the Legislature and the judges. Steward was able
to articulate the new vision in concepts that appealed both to liberals and
conservatives in the “Show Me” state. For liberals, the new system offered more
humane treatment of youth and less incarceration; for conservatives, the system
appeared to be less costly and emphasized teaching individual accountability to
the youth. Decentralizing the location of the Missouri DYS facilities created
economic benefits for the many rural communities that hosted the new programs.
It is especially notable that the major reinvention of juvenile corrections in
Missouri survived with little challenge during changing state political leadership
that spanned the ideological spectrum.
Noted juvenile corrections authority Richard Mendel has produced the most
123
detailed and persuasive description of the Missouri DYS model. Mendel places
great importance on the decision to downsize the population of the facilities. He
also notes that the Missouri DYS created a culture dedicated to continuous
improvements and to engagement with the outside community; the Missouri
Model depends on a strong and hopeful vision of the potential for youth
124
rehabilitation. The agency articulated and reinforced an organizational culture
that rejected punishment as the dominant behavior management tool and replaced
it with a caring and empathetic approach to its young clients. Mendel believes
that the Missouri Model requires that there be highly motivated staff that are
willing to engage the youth whenever and wherever these connections are
125
needed. The staff are taught not to fear the youth and to seek safety through
relationships with them, not via coercive practices. Missouri makes preparation
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for aftercare the central focus of all programs and highlights the necessity of very
individualized educational and treatment services. Quality case management is
the lynchpin of the Missouri system.
C. The Role of Staff in Reforming the New York State Juvenile Corrections
System
A somewhat different analysis of the dynamics of juvenile corrections
change involves the New York State Office of Children and Family Services.
126
(OCFS). Professor Cox describes in some detail the perceptions of staff to
127
juvenile corrections reform. She helps us understand how staff might be better
enlisted to support change efforts.
In the period beginning in 2007, New York State closed a large number of
128
juvenile corrections facilities that were located around the state. There were
several staff layoffs and reductions in facility management personnel. Most of
these institutions were located in upstate rural communities and their closure
exerted a big economic impact on this region.
Some of these closures were responsive to a deep fiscal crisis faced by the
state and by a trend of declining juvenile arrests and fewer youth being sent to
OCFS facilities by the courts. The cost of operating the OCFS placements was
approaching $275,000 per youth on an annual basis. Besides the severe
budgetary pressures, there were reports of brutal and abusive practices in the
129
facilities. The U.S. DOJ began an investigation under the auspices of the Civil
130
Rights of Institutionalized Persons Act (CRIPA). This investigation centered on
five OCFS facilities and the U.S. DOJ demanded changes to stave off federal
131
civil rights enforcement. The OCFS agreed to a comprehensive agreement to
remedy the deficiencies and some of the specific facilities were closed.
The Governor recruited noted child legal rights advocate Gladys Carrion to
132
reform the New York State System. Ms. Carrion brought in a new management
team of trusted professionals from other states to manage the closures and to fix
the inadequate treatment of OCFS youth.

126. COX, supra note 24, at 2.
127. Id. at 17–18.
128. Id. at 2.
129. Stephen A. Newman, Foreword: The Past, Present, and Future of Juvenile Justice Reform in New
York State, 56 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 1263, 1264 (2012).
130. Id.
131. Letter from Loretta King, N.Y. Attorney Gen., to David Patterson, N.Y. Governor (Aug. 14, 2009)
(on file with the McGeorge Law Review).
132. Press Release, State of N.Y., Governor Patterson Announces Task Force on Transforming New
York’s Juvenile Justice System (Sept. 10, 2008), http://media-newswire.com/release_1072711.html (on file
with the McGeorge Law Review).
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There was intense staff opposition to the new management team and claims
that the program and policy changes had generated a wave of youth violence and
staff assaults. A video tape of youth attacking staff at one OCFS institution was
taken by a dismissed employee and broadcast on a local New York City
133
television station and the video ultimately went viral on the Internet. The
employee union staged work stoppages to protest against the new management
134
team. Members of the Legislature and the state Auditor General conducted an
investigation. The relationship between Commissioner Carrion and the OCFS
staff remained strained until she left in 2013 to head up New York City’s child
welfare and juvenile corrections agency.
Against the background of this intense staff resistance to reform, OCFS was
still able to meet most of the requirements of its agreement under CRIPA. There
were many improvements in the quality and quantity of rehabilitative services for
OCFS youngsters. Other litigation was held off as OCFS made steady progress to
reduce the UOF, eliminate unnecessary solitary confinement, introduce traumainformed therapy for its young people, and upgrade mental health and education
services.
Alexandra Cox observed that in New York, as in other locales, the critical
135
nature of the work of front-line staff was often overlooked or undervalued. The
front-line staff were often victimized by myths that they lacked basic cultural
sensitivity with the largely urban population and youth of color who were the
inmates of the OCFS facilities. In fact, over half of the OCFS direct-care staff
were African Americans and many came from the same urban communities as
the OCFS young people.
Opposition to reform and program closures was explained away by vested
economic interests due to the loss of wages and fringe benefits. Staff were
sometimes viewed as too punishment-oriented and unwilling to truly embrace a
treatment philosophy. Interviews conducted by Cox revealed that staff resistance
to change was rooted in a sense of being excluded in the planning and design of
reforms. Changes in policies and procedures were perceived as confusing, illconceived, and subject to nonstop revisions. The staff wanted to be part of
meaningful discussions about reforms and offer their practical advice on how to
best effectuate the desired results.
Uncertainty as to jobs, changing local management assignments, and the
future existence of these facilities led to a profound sense of being disrespected
and treated unfairly. These staff felt they were victims of the stereotype that they
133. Press Release, Catherine Young, N.Y. St. Senator, Lawmakers Call on Governor to Ax OCFS
Commissioner After Further Evidence of Violence in Juvenile Homes (Mar. 10, 2011), http://www.nysenate.
gov/press-release/lawmakers-call-governor-ax-ocfs-commissioner-after-further-evidence-violence-juvenil-0 (on
file with the McGeorge Law Review).
134. COX, supra note 24, at 6.
135. Id.
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did not support treatment. Professor Cox found that there was actually a
significant group of OCFS personnel who wanted to advance treatment goals for
youth. This group wanted a larger role for reentry and educational services for
the youth and not just social and emotional therapy.
Professor Cox noted that staff felt unsafe if they perceived a loss of control.
As the OCFS changed its policies on UOF, disciplinary practices, and isolation,
the staff wanted alternatives and tools to better manage disruptive youth behavior
and defiance of their authority.
D. Bedlam in Arizona
The last juvenile corrections case study that I examined was produced as part
of the tracking of CRIPA reforms undertaken by the Arizona Department of
136
Juvenile Corrections (ADJC). It revealed a familiar story of abuse and neglect
of youth that caused condemnation of the agency by outside youth advocacy
groups and many members of the Legislature. However, a surge in the number of
suicides by youth and one attempted suicide by a staff member heightened the
137
demand for immediate action. There were also instances in which staff had
brutally assaulted one of the youth residents and at least one staff member was
138
indicted for having sex with an underage ADJC resident.
139
The U.S. DOJ conducted an investigation under CRIPA. Resistance to
change was strong among the corrections workers and middle managers at
ADJC. The Governor Janet Napolitano established a special task force to
examine the causes of the crisis in ADJC and brought in new leadership.
Many ADJC staff agreed that the CRIPA reforms were needed, but they
lacked confidence that the agency would be given sufficient resources to
implement these changes. There was suspicion that the impetus for reform would
fade as the CRIPA agreement was slowly put into operation.
As progress to change the organization was too slow, Governor Jan Brewer
140
threatened to defund the ADJC and transfer its youth to privately run programs.
The combination of strong outside pressure by advocacy groups and the U.S.
DOJ and the real possibility that the entire system would close down produced
the impetus to speed up reforms.
Key to the advanced reform momentum was a forceful and influential new
Director of ADJC, Michael Branham, who built an internal management team
devoted to change. Branham had a past career in law enforcement not in juvenile
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corrections, and some were concerned that his police background would send
ADJC backwards. But Branham, and his deputy Dianne Gadow, were generally
credited with changing the culture of the organization to meet the objectives of
the CRIPA consent decree. Branham instituted data-driven accountability
systems and created quality assurance processes to sustain the positive changes.
There were many more checks and balances that ensured that young people in
ADJC were being accorded the care that they were entitled to by law and
common morality. Even as Director Branham retired, another leader with a
strong background in corrections came in and continued Branham’s vision and
protocols.
Branham immersed himself in agency operations and spent substantial time
at the facilities and in the living units. Similar to California DJJ Director Michael
Minor, Branham put a high value on transparency and shared the results of the
CRIPA monitoring reports throughout Arizona. The level of compliance with the
CRIPA agreement rose quickly as ADJC articulated the value of the CRIPA
reforms to judges, legislators, and the law enforcement community.
Compliance with the requirements of the CRIPA agreement was not uniform
in every area. Strides forward were accomplished in discovering and punishing
misconduct by staff. Educational services improved, but progress in providing
adequate medical and mental health care lagged behind.
VIII. REFORMING CALIFORNIA JUVENILE CORRECTIONS: CONCLUDING
OBSERVATIONS
There are several policy conclusions that should be drawn from this study
and analysis. First and foremost, large and constructive improvements can be
actualized even in the most troubled juvenile corrections systems. These reforms
do not happen overnight and sustaining new methods of treating youth takes
141
patience and a steadfast focus on the goals to be achieved. Central to the
humane care of troubled youth is a fundamental shift in the organizational culture
away from containment, confrontation, and coercion and towards empathy, basic
knowledge about adolescent mental and social development, and supportive
relationships between staff and young people.
Leadership is essential to promoting and expanding the needed culture shift.
Staff need to feel valued and included in the change process. Effective leaders
broadcast their vision and rely on others to flesh out the operational details and
day-to-day reality of this vision. There must be systems of accountability and
checks and balances for youngsters and agency personnel. The leader should be

141. At one court hearing, the S&W court expert (me) opined that it should take no more than three years
to meet all of the obligations under the Farrell consent decree—I was way off in my estimate of the time
needed for reform.
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committed to transparency and skilled at establishing and nurturing strong allies
for the reforms, and there must be sufficient resources dedicated to the human
care of troubled youth. Creating and nurturing an atmosphere of trust among the
many individuals who will be involved in the reforms is a must.
Litigation or related civil rights enforcement is a valuable predicate for
change. Few troubled bureaucracies change spontaneously. However, the legal
route must be tempered with ultimate attention to improving the care of youth,
not just court victories.
Outsiders including Special Masters, court experts, and renowned national
juvenile justice figures can add great value by exposing the juvenile corrections
agency to the latest research and best professional opinions. They can also create
a structure of accountability and standards of performance that are difficult to
generate internally.
Change needs to be planned, managed, and monitored closely. There must be
clear lines of authority and responsibility for reform, and these must be grounded
in the chain of command. It is unwise to try to fix everything that is broken all at
once. Pilot testing new policies and programs is a very important strategy.
Making progress in upgrading the basic care of youth including medical,
dental, and mental health services can lay the foundation for the culture shift that
is necessary. The conditions of the living units and the physical plant of
institutions clearly communicate what value the adults place on the young people
that they serve. It is often promising to start by upgrading the education program
because these services are vital to the future success of all of the young people in
juvenile corrections.
The preeminent need to develop and assist young people in realistic plans to
return home is the centerpiece of high quality juvenile corrections programs.
Youth who can see the way back to the community will be more enthusiastic
customers of treatment and educational services.
Lastly, we return to the principle that smaller is better. Living units must be
made even smaller and the large reform school will likely be a memory in the not
too distant past. Smaller facilities promote greater safety and permit the sorts of
positive role modeling and counseling that staff want to offer and that the youth
desperately need.
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